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What is the ideal role for a judge in today's litigation environment? Should
it be passive-waiting in her chambers for the lawyers to bring motions raising
issues and disputes during the pretrial process, then presiding over trial? Or
should it be proactive-initiating conferences periodically during the pretrial
process to steer the case and prevent disputes, then presiding over trial?
While "presiding over trial" is repeated in both options, trial has become almost
a curiosity in federal civil litigation, with about one percent of cases going to trial.
In today's litigation climate, the debate over judges'posture isa debate over pretrial
behavior; litigation is pretrial practice in a world where nearly every case settles.
Survey data suggest an uncommon agreement between plaintiffs and
defendants that more judicial involvement leads to quicker, less expensive, and
more satisfying results. Yet, scholars criticize active judicial case management
as contributing to the demise of the trial and undermining the integrity of the
judicial system. They paint pictures of judges strong-arming parties to settle,
allowing their personal biases to intrude into the proceedings, and
exacerbating costs and delays. This Article departs from that widely held view.
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow active case management,
they require almost none. The Advisory Committee, which drafted the extensive
and controversial 2015 amendments, has consistently opted to encourage, rather
than require, judges to become more involved in the pretrial process.
This Article reconceptualizes managerial judges after the death of the trial
and recommends that the Rules require judges to actively manage their cases.
More fundamentally, there needs to be a paradigm shift in the normative
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expectations for judges. Today's judges need to be case managers, selected for
their temperament and skills as managers, trained to manage cases, and then
trusted to manage their cases at the pretrial stage fairly, transparently, and
appropriately-just as they are trusted at the trial stage.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal litigation operates today in a changed environment. In
particular, the disappearance of the trial from federal court is well
documented.' In 1938, when courts first began operating under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, about eighteen percent of cases
went to trial.2 The percentage fluctuated thereafter, but trended
downward over the years, falling to the eleven to twelve percent range
1. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006J. Disp. RESOL. 7, 12 (2006)
(noting that, while media fixates on stories of excessive trial and litigation, in reality
there has been a decline in trials); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination
of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459,
464 (2004) (describing the decreasing percentage of cases that ended in trial).
2. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
Wis. L. REv. 631, 633 n.3.
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during the late 1960s and '70s.' By 1984, it had decreased to about
six percent.' Today, just over one percent of cases go to trial.5
This precipitous decline in trials has been the focus of numerous
articles.' Coercion by judges to settle cases on their dockets and the
cost of litigation in general, or discovery in particular, are potential
culprits behind this trend.' Regardless of the cause of the decline in
trials, however, the consequence is the same: if judges are to have a
meaningful role in advancing the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive"
determination of matters before them, they cannot primarily play
their part in a black robe ruling on evidentiary objections at trial.
Rather, the role of judges must adapt to the new litigation climate
and must focus on the pretrial process.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules") were conceived as
one unified set of rules flexible enough to govern cases of all sizes
and variations in complexity.' Discovery illustrates this point nicely.
Discovery is scalable-capable of being expanded for large complex
cases and shrunk for small, simple ones.' Because discovery must be
3. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494, 558 tbl.1 (1986).
4. Id.
5. Judicial Business, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, U.S. District
Courts-Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken, During the 12-
Month Period Ending September 30, 2013, tbl.C-4 (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-4/judicial-business/2013/09/30.
6. See generally, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the
United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522 (2012); Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement: The
Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. SEc. LmG. Winter 2004, at 1; Xavier Rodriguez, The Decline of
CivilJury Trials: A Positive Development, Myth, or the End ofJustice as We Now Know It?, 45
ST. MARY'S LAwJ. 333 (2014).
7. See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett et al., Judges' Views on Vanishing Civil Trials, 88
JUDICATURE 306, 307 (2005) (attributing the decline of civil jury trials to, among
others, the increasing use of alternative dispute resolution and summary judgment,
rising litigation costs and stakes at issue, and a lack of trial experience among judges
andjudicial resources); William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, VanishingJuries, Vanishing
Constitution, 40 SUFFoLK U. L. REv. 67, 80-81 (2006) (explaining the federal courts'
shift from trials to a "settlement culture").
8. See Steven S. Gensler, judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60
DuKE L.J. 669, 698 (2010) (noting that "the same set of Civil Rules applies to all civil
cases in federal court, regardless of the size, complexity, or subject matter of the case,
or the dollar amount in controversy"); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of
Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the "One Size Fits All" Assumption, 87
DENV. U. L. REv. 377, 386 (2010) (explaining that the Advisory Committee created the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with a strong insistence on simplicity and flexibility).
9. See Subrin, supra note 8, at 392 (indicating that on one hand, many civil suits
do not involve much discovery, but on the other hand, there is widespread agreement
that a substantial number of cases involve an overwhelming amount of discovery).
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tailored to fit the particulars of each case, it is one phase of litigation
where the debate about active judges crystalizes: do the parties make
the alterations themselves, or does the judge fashion the process?'0
This Article will use discovery to explore the issues surrounding the
evolving role ofjudges throughout the pretrial proceedings.
Although the Rules authorize the judge to "right-size" discovery in
the initial case management order, much of the scaling is typically
delegated to the parties in the first instance, with the judge engaging
only upon request." In our adversarial system, however, cooperation
among the parties on how to configure discovery, without the
ongoing monitoring and assistance of the judge, is simply not realistic
in many cases. As a starting point, the parties typically have diametrically
opposite and mutually exclusive objectives in the litigation.
Furthermore, the asymmetries between the parties often make it difficult
to find common ground on even procedural issues; one party will often
have more electronically stored information than the other, will have
more resources to devote to discovery, or will experience
disproportionately greater advantage or disadvantage from delay.'"
Indeed, discovery has been compared to nuclear war." It should not be
10. There is certainly room for active, managerial judging for other phases of
civil litigation. Judges can take an active or passive role in settlement, for example,
and much of the perceived risk of active judging arises in the settlement context.
Likewise, judges can be more proactive regarding issues like joinder of third parties,
amendments, and motion practice. Because judges can have the biggest impact on
the cost and pace of litigation in the context of discovery, though, this Article will
primarily focus on the discovery aspects of activejudges.
11. See Subrin, supra note 8, at 392 ("In other words, the lawyers under this
characterization are effectively sorting cases on a case-size basis, despite the
transsubstantive, equity-like nature of the Rules.").
12. Id. at 388 ("When a procedure that permits the joinder of so many claims,
issues, and parties coalesces with this lawyer training and canon of ethics, and one
also adds to the mix the widest array of discovery possibilities. . . , the temptation to
expand the litigation in terms of time, expense, and nuggets of information can
prove irresistible."). Other strategic reasons, such as wearing out the other side
mentally and economically, may also encourage parties to drag out the litigation
process and expand discovery beyond what is necessary. Id.
13. John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear
Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 569, 569 (1989); see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 635, 635 (1989) ("That discovery is
war comes as no surprise. That discovery is nuclear war, as John Setear suggests, is.
Discovery more often calls to mind the trench warfare of World War I, the war of
attrition. During World War I cooperative patterns evolved, as soldiers called time-
out and even sang holiday carols to the other side. The cooperation broke down as
fresh troops, or worse, new officers, arrived on the scene and disregarded the
established patterns." (footnotes omitted)).
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surprising then that these asymmetries in resources and strategy lead
adversaries to seek tactical advantages in the pretrial process rather than
setting those interests aside to work cooperatively with their opponents.14
Under the current rules, the only mandated interaction with the
judge before or during the discovery process occurs in connection
with the parties' Rule 26(f) proposed discovery plan.'" In the
majority of cases, the judge charts the course of the discovery process
based only on that document, without even speaking with the
parties.'6 In other cases, the judge speaks with the parties at an initial
Rule 16 conference prior to issuing the case management order.' 7
Many of these judges then disengage after the first conference,
leaving the parties to manage themselves unless a dispute arises."'
Neither of these approaches is a recipe for effective and efficient
pretrial proceedings. A judge who does not even meet with the
parties before setting the discovery parameters is hardly in a position
to assess all of the complexities that should factor into decisions about
how the case should proceed. Nor is one "drive by" conference with
the judge at the beginning of a case sufficient to overcome the
impediments to cooperation and proportionality. Based on the
information available at the initial status conference, the judge is rarely
able to accurately calibrate proportionality, nor is she likely to be able
to ensure cooperation throughout the pretrial process.'" The most
logical way to achieve "cooperation and proportionality" is for the judge
to engage with the parties on a regular basis throughout the litigation."o
14. See Setear, supra note 13, at 583-85 (explaining that game theory suggests
that the parties are not individually incentivized to cooperate in the discovery
process, even though both might be better off if they did).
15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (2) (requiring submission of a discovery plan).
16. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-
BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON CIVIL RULES 11-12 (2009) [hereinafter FJC REPORT],
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurvl.pdf/$fie/dissurvl.pdf.
17. Id. at 13.
18. Id.
19. See Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 638 ("Judges can do little about
impositional discovery when parties control the legal claims to be presented and
conduct the discovery themselves.").
20. SeeJUD. CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIv. RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. &
PROC., REPORT TO THE CHIEFJUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE
ON CIVIL LITIGATION 4 (2010) [hereinafter CIVIL LITIGATION REPORT],
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-
committees/special-projects-rules-committees/2010-civil (observing that if the Rules
are to be changed, "sustained, active, hands-on judicial case management" and
"cooperation and proportionality" are necessary to make those changes effective).
2015] 357
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In 2010, over two hundred judges, practitioners, and professors
attended a conference at Duke University School of Law to discuss
improvements to the pretrial process.2 ' They converged on three
deficits in our civil litigation system, summarizing them as follows:
"What is needed can be described in two words-cooperation and
proportionality-and one phrase-sustained, active, hands-on judicial
case management."22 The report from the conference described these
three deficits as gaining "nearly unanimous agreement" by plaintiffs
and defendants, liberals and conservatives.
One would expect, then, that the 2015 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, flowing directly from the Duke Conference,
would be replete with new provisions to advance "sustained, active,
hands-on judicial case management."2  One would, however, be
mistaken. The extensive set of amendments does not contain a single
revision mandating active case management Instead, the Committee
opted to "encourage" more active case management25 by giving judges the
express option (which they already had implicitly) of ordering the parties
to participate in a conference before filing discovery motions. 26
The Committee has been encouraging active case management since
at least 1983,27 but the data suggest that judges have resisted changing
their traditional roles. The present litigation climate makes the need for
managerial judges more compelling, and amending the Rules to
mandate a more active role for judges may be the only way to change
mostjudges' behavior. Not only is there a rare consensus among parties
21. Id. at 1.
22. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
23. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIV. PROC., REPORT OF THE DUKE CONFERENCE
SUBcoMMITTEE 79 (APR. 10-11, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15486/download.
Not everyone agreed with the report, of course. See, e.g., Danya Shocair Reda, The
Cost-and-Delay Narrative in CivilJustice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV.
1085, 1086 (2012) (contending that he data do not support the common perception
that federal court litigation is too costly and slow-what the author terms the "cost-
and-delay narrative").
24. CIVIL LITGATION REPORT, supra note 20, at 4.
25. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIV. PROC., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIvIL RULES TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 8 (MAY 8,
2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2013.pdf.
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(v) (stating that "[t]he scheduling order
may ... set dates for pretrial conferences and for trial").
27. See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Towards Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1561, 1588 (2003) ("Beginning in 1983, Rule 16 was amended to require case
management activity by all judges in most cases, and to encourage more managerial
activity than was required." (footnote omitted)). See generally David L. Shapiro, Federal
Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1984-87
(1989) (describing the history of Rule 16 and the purposes of the 1983 amendment).
[Vol. 65:353358
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on "both sides of the v" that the process benefits from such activejudges,
the current litigation reality has diminished the historic role ofjudges.2 1
Seventy percent of the cost in complex federal itigation is incurred
in discovery,' and 100% of the costs are incurred in the pretrial
process in the vast majority of cases.0 Judges are relegated to
bystanders if they do not participate actively in the pretrial process.
Recognizing this reality changes the normative view ofjudges. Rather
than selecting judges primarily for their abilities to preside over
trial-skills they will exercise in only 1.2% of the matters on their
dockets-the criteria for selecting judges must include skills to enable
them to excel in handling the other 98.8% of cases that resolve
before trial. Judges could then be trained to become effective and
transparent case managers, and their performance as case managers
could be monitored and evaluated in the pretrial phase of litigation."
Inherent in this paradigm shift is trusting judges to manage their
cases fairly and transparently." Much of the criticism of active,
managerial judges is rooted in a mistrust ofjudges-concerns that they
will abuse or misuse their discretionary powers. If our judges cannot be
trusted, however, the solution is to pick more trustworthy judges, not to
accept untrustworthy judges and diminish their authority. Judges are
trusted to preside over trials fairly and can also be trusted to do the
same in the pretrial process-with appropriate safeguards comparable
to those that protect againstjudicial abuse at trial."
28. See Jonathan T. Molot, An Old judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE
L.J. 27, 34-36 (2003) (explaining that the historic role of judges was to rely on
parties to frame the disputes, and on law to resolve those disputes); Victor Eugene
Flango, Judicial Roles for Modern Courts, NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. (Nov. 2013),
http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2013/home/
Monthly-Trends-Articles/Judicial-Roles-for-Modern-Courts.aspx ("Yet we all have a
conception of what ajudge should be-a distinguished person presiding over a trial.").
29. AM. BAR As'N, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE:
FULL REPORT 2 (2009) [hereinafter ABA SURVEY].
30. By definition, all costs and fees are incurred in the pretrial process in the
98.8% of the cases that resolve before trial.
31. Although the details of who would monitor the judges' performance as case
managers and the criteria they would use is beyond the scope of this Article,
appellate courts could evaluate the trial judges' performance for appealed matters,
and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts could also monitor the judges'
performance through the metrics it compiles. Additionally, any interested groups or
academics could monitor the judges as well.
32. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges .... ).
33. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 427-28 (1982) (referring to
certain safeguards, uch as statutory disqualification rules, to ensure judges' impartiality).
2015] .359
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This Article will start with an overview of the historical debate
regarding managerial judges, sparked by Judith Resnik's landmark
article. It will then advance arguments in favor of, and address the
criticisms of, active judicial management. Finally, this Article will
recommend that the Advisory Committee move beyond its attempts to
encourage ongoing, hands-on case management and adopt amendments
requiring greaterjudicial involvement in the pretrial process.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEBATE
The concept of the active judge is, of course, not new, nor has it
been free from controversy. Professor Resnik started the dialog
regarding proactive judges in an iconic article she wrote in 1982 in
anticipation of the expansion of judges' authority in the 1983
amendments to Rule 16." In her article, she coined the term
"managerial judges" and roundly criticized the concept." Resnik
identified a number of risks inherent in active judicial management.3 6
First, she noted the lack of transparency when judges manage cases in
chambers, off the record.3 1 Second, she observed that the statistical
metrics by which we evaluate judges might lead them to exercise their
34. See generally id. at 376-80 (setting forth that judicial roles have shifted from a
sense of "disengagement" to being more active and managerial and asserting that the
1983 amendments would solidify this shift).
35. Id. at 378. Resnik criticized both active judicial management of the litigation
process and active judicial management of the remedy, such as actively supervising
"the implementation of a wide range of remedies designed to desegregate schools
and to reform prisons and other institutions." Id. at 377 (footnote omitted). This
Article addresses only activejudicial management of the litigation process.
36. Resnik illustrates her objections to managerial judges through two
hypothetical scenarios. In these scenarios, she portrays managerial judges as
engaging in abusive practices that even advocates of active judges would condemn.
For example, when called on to rule on a discovery motion, the fictional judge in
one of the cases instead held ex parte meetings with each party to coerce settlement.
Id. at 390. While that judge's behavior was improper, one could easily construct a
hypothetical case in which active judicial management was of tremendous benefit to
the lawyers, the parties, the court, and justice. The fact that one can conceive of
situations in which a judge might abusively-or beneficially-use the powers
bestowed on her to manage cases does little to illuminate whether, in balance, the
judicial system benefits from those powers-virtually any power can be abused. See
Steven Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response To Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505,
508 (1984) (criticizing Resnik for failing to provide evidence, other than her own
hypotheticals, either of judges abusing their case management powers or of the
negative effects ofjudicial case management).
37. See Resnik, supra note 33, at 378 ("Managerial judges frequently work beyond
the public view, off the record, with no obligation to provide written, reasoned
opinions, and out of reach of appellate review.").
[Vol. 65:353360
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managerial function in a way that preferentially rewards the number
and rapidity of case resolution over the quality of that resolution.3
She viewed endowing judges with new case management powers as
sailing into uncharted waters, with potential for abuse": exposing
the judge to the facts and the parties' arguments during the pretrial
phase of the lawsuit would lift the metaphorical blindfold from Lady
Justice"o and could lead to a lack of impartiality.' This concern is
heightened, she reasoned, if the judge is exposed during the pretrial
process to evidence that would be inadmissible at trial."
Two years later, Professor Steven Flanders wrote a rejoinder to
Resnik's article, sharply disagreeing with her." Resnik had illustrated
her concerns with two hypothetical scenarios in which active judicial
management resulted in inappropriate judicial conduct, such as
coercive settlement tactics." Flanders criticized these hypotheticals
as not representing real world behavior." He summarized the results
38. See id. at 380 ("Moreover, judicial management may be teaching judges to
value their statistics, such as the number of case dispositions, more than they value
the quality of their dispositions.").
39. See id. at 425 ("Transforming the judge from adjudicator to manager
substantially expands the opportunities forjudges to use-or abuse-their power.").
40. See id. at 431 ("Although the sword remains in place, the blindfold and scales
have all but disappeared."). Professor Resnik traces the historical evolution of the
iconography ofjustice, observing that the blindfold was originally a derisive symbol,
suggesting ignorance and lack of insight. Id. at 447. By the end of the sixteenth
century, however, the blindfold had become a "symbol of impartiality." Id. at 448.
41. See id. at 427 ("The extensive information that judges receive during pretrial
conferences has not been filtered by the rules of evidence."). The combination of ex
parte discussions and close contact that the judge has with attorneys during the
course of management could lead to personal bias. See id.
42. Id. at 413. Of course, judges are exposed to inadmissible evidence in almost
every case. Prior to trial, parties file motions in limine, the very purpose of which is
to ask the judge to consider certain evidence and rule it inadmissible. At trial,
parties routinely seek to introduce evidence that the court ultimately deems
inadmissible, after considering the evidence. There is no research or compelling
argument suggesting that ajudge will be more prejudiced or influenced by exposure
to such inadmissible evidence at earlier stages of the pretrial process.
43. See Flanders, supra note 36, at 508 (arguing that Resnik's approach and her
use of two hypothetical models were "disingenuous" and did not demonstrate
anything of value).
44. See Resnik, supra note 33, at 376-77, 386, 387. For example, in one of
Resnik's hypotheticals, the judge exerts an extreme degree of pressure on the parties
to settle their case, suggesting a settlement figure, telling the parties that the court
"looked with disfavor upon uncompromising litigants," and then postponing ruling on
pending motions until the parties had more time to consider settlement Id. at 390.
45. See Flanders, supra note 36, at 508 ("Professor Resnik's central error is that
she builds her argument on a foundation of two hypothetical 'models.' These
models are the basis of her 'description' of what she understands to be 'managerial
2015] 361
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of a study he conducted that compared the number of days it took
passive and active judges to complete cases.6 For cases settling, he
measured an average duration of 366 days for cases before active
judges and 682 days for cases before passive judges." For cases going
to trial, he calculated an average of 472 days for cases before active
judges and 945 days for cases before passive judges." In other words,
according to Flanders' study, cases before active judges resolve
approximately twice as fast as those before passive judges, whether by
settlement or by trial. Flanders also took issue with Resnik's ideal of
blind justice. He argued that many of the rulings judges make are
better shaped by context, such as relevance rulings.4 9
Stoked with ample fuel, the fires of this debate have continued to
smolder for the last thirty-plus years. Judges soon threw their own
logs onto the embers. Judge Robert Peckham wrote an article in 1985
defending the value of active judicial management.0 He argued that
the risk of judicial bias and exposure to inadmissible evidence is not
unique to the pretrial process-judges must set aside biases at trial and
put inadmissible evidence out of their minds when making rulings." He
advocated that all pretrial conferences be conducted on the record,
with all parties present, to alleviate concerns about lack of transparency
or accountability." He did not defend the coercive settlement tactics
that the fictitious judge employed in Resnik's hypothetical case; rather,
he condemned the tactics, but not the managerial approach to judging
judging.'"). Flanders considered Resnik's approach to be "disingenuous at best"
because she did not demonstrate how her hypothetical facts would conform to the
real world. Id.
46. Flanders described active judges as using case management tools including
"1) mechanisms to screen cases early forjurisdictional or recusal problems; 2) tailor-
made schedules that will bring each case to the earliest possible resolution; 3) close
supervision of discovery; and 4) the well-known components of rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure ... that bear on the scope and conduct of the trial." Id. at
514-15 (footnotes omitted).
47. Id. at 519.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 520.
50. Robert F. Peckham, A judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case
Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37
RUTGERS L. REv. 253 (1985) [hereinafter Peckham, Ajudicial Response]; see also Robert
F. Peckham, The Federal judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from
Filing to Disposition, 69 CAuF. L. REv. 770 (1981).
51. See Peckham, A judicial Response, supra note 50, at 262 (emphasizing that
issues of impermissible evidence arise regularly when judges are faced with
evidentiary objections, but "[i]mpartiality is a capacity of mind" and judges are
trusted to know how to proceed without impartiality or bias).
52. Id. at 263.
362 [Vol. 65:353
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that enabled them,53 ultimately advocating for more expanded active
judicial management 5
Another prominent voice in this debate was Judge Frank
Easterbrook, who wrote on the subject in 1989." Easterbrook landed
on Resnik's side of the debate, but for different reasons. To manage
discovery, Easterbrook observed, a judge must be able to distinguish
between "normal" or appropriate discovery and "impositional"
discovery (discovery imposed so that the cost of responding will
influence the opponent's settlement posture)." Easterbrook
reasoned that judges are not in a position to distinguish between
normal and impositional discovery at the outset of the case because
they do not know enough about the facts and issues to make this
assessment.57  At the same time, he believed, the parties are
incentivized to distort, or at least exaggerate, the information they
present to the judge, hoping to influence the judge's evaluation of
normal and impositional discovery.58  Accordingly, Easterbrook
argued, judges cannot make informed judgments about the scope
and course of discovery at the outset of the case."
In 2006 and 2007, interest in the judiciary's role flared again. In
his 2006 article, Professor Jay Tidmarsh observed that the goal of
litigation should be resolution of cases on the merits.' Whenever a
judge must exercise discretion, there is the potential for the issue to
become a contested matter, diverting the case away from the merits."
53. Id. at 264. Peckham describes the primary purpose of status conferences as
"to plan and structure the pretrial and trial stages of litigation," which could promote
settlements in an indirect way if properly conducted. Id. at 267.
54. Specifically, Peckham advocated a two-tiered discovery system with
interwoven alternative dispute resolution procedures. Parties would conduct initial
discovery on issues key to settlement prospects, then participate in an alternative
dispute resolution process, and then conduct additional discovery as needed if the
case did not settle. Id. at 267-68.
55. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 13.
56. Id. at 637-38. Discovery is only "normal" (meaning appropriate) if the cost to
the party propounding the discovery (ignoring the responding party) is less than the
anticipated effect on the ultimate judgment (not on settlement). Id. at 637.
Discovery that is not normal is "impositional"-excessive, or abusive. Id.
57. Id. at 638-39 (reasoning that the Rules encourage parties to file "sketchy"
complaints and develop the facts during discovery, such that, at the outset of a case,
the court will not have a clear sense of the facts or the issues).
58. Id. at 638.
59. Id. at 638-39.
60. Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTREDAME L. REv. 513,515 (2006).
61. Id. at 558.
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Vesting judges with discretion, therefore, only leads to "expense,
delay, unpredictability, and abuse of power." 2
In 2007, Professor Robert Bone evaluated procedural discretion
not on the basis of expediency, but rather by questioning whether
judges are properly trained or skilled in case management. "The
pervasive assumption that expert trial judges can do a good job of
tailoring procedures to individual cases is empirically unsupported
and at best highly questionable. In fact, judges face serious problems
fashioning case-specific procedures to work well in the highly
strategic environment of litigation . . . .""
The 2010 Duke Conference further fanned interest in the issue.
Professor Elizabeth Thornburg wrote an article echoing Professor
Tidmarsh's concern about judicial discretion." In her article, she
observed that concerns about ajudge's influence of discretion or bias
should not be confined to the pretrial phase of litigation." She
noted that the rules pertaining to trials cede almost unfettered
discretion to the trial judge' Judges make numerous rulings during
trial, both substantive and procedural, which are discretionary and
very difficult to overturn on appeal.6 Thornburg concluded that
excessive management at any stage-pretrial or trial-is problematic,
particularly when management entails a "myopic focus on speed."'
Professor Steven Gensler wrote an article characterizing judicial
activism as one piece of a many-piece puzzle affecting the
62. Id.
63. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDozo L. REv. 1961, 1963 (2007).
64. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The ManagerialJudge Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICHMOND L.
REv. 1261 (2010).
65. Id. at 1265. Professor Thornburg was not disagreeing with Resnik's
fundamental premise that managerial judging was undesirable. Id. at 1271-72. To
the contrary, she agrees heartily with Resnik and only argues that the same concerns
apply at the trial stage if ajudge is managerial rather than passive. Id. at 1291.
66. Id. at 1262 ("The procedural rules that govern the actual trial do almost
nothing to guide or constrain judicial discretion. There are rules about juries,
evidence, and jury instructions, but in substance and application most are almost
wholly discretionary.").
67. See id. (mentioning the very basic limits imposed by the rules at trial, which
result in a wide latitude of judicial discretion). Thornburg states that "[i]f there is a
jury, the judge will give it some kind of charge, requesting some kind of verdict. The
parties must be treated in a way that is not facially unequal. But that is about it." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
68. Id. at 1266-67 ("The business of managerial judging is accomplished not by
applying the law, but by using the judge's own beliefs about the techniques best
suited to lead a case to a quick and efficient end.").
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performance of the federal courts,' noting that the current
transsubstantive system relies heavily on judicial discretion. He argued
that we either need to overhaul the system to reduce the need forjudicial
discretion--such as by adding tracks or some other differentiated
provisions to accommodate the needs of different sized cases-or we need
to optimize the system for the exercise of judicial discretion.70 Gensler
argued that discretionary case management represents a policy choice
regarding not only how we wantjudges spending their time, but also that
it more broadly implicates how we want cases resolved.'
Rule 1 instructs that cases be resolved justly, speedily, and
inexpensively." The debate about managerial judges begs the
question: does active judicial case management promote that end?
II. THE ARGUMENT FOR ACTIVE JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
This Article posits that, unless we are going to scrap our current
federal civil litigation structure, the arguments for active and ongoing
judicial case management during the pretrial process are more
compelling than those against managerial judges. It acknowledges
the validity of concerns raised by opponents of active case
management, but explains that those concerns can be mitigated.
The next subsection advances the case for active judicial case
management and the subsequent subsection addresses the concerns.
A. The Case for Active judges
The evidence and arguments supporting active judging are
convincing. Perhaps most compelling are the survey data.73 Various
legal organizations conducted a number of surveys in the period
leading up to the Duke Conference, finding that both plaintiffs and
defendants responded in favor of active judging-and these two
groups do not agree on much.
69. See Gensler, supra note 8, at 672-73.
70. Id. at 719, 723-36.
71. Id. at 744.
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
73. See, e.g., AM. C. OF TRIAL LAW. & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
Sys., FINAL REPORT (2009) [hereinafter AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS SURVEY],
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/Conten
tDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=4053 (reflecting views within the American College of
Trial Lawyers about the role of discovery in the civil justice system); ABA SURVEY,
supra note 29 (reflecting members' views of pre-trial practice in federal court);
FJC REPORT, supra note 16 (reflecting attorneys' experiences in pre-trial
practice in federal civil cases).
74. These surveys tended to ask for non-quantitative, "Likert-type scale"
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1. The survey data
In 2009, the American Bar Association (ABA) published its survey
results in a detailed report.5 The respondents" were asked a series
of questions about the cost of litigation in federal court. The report
revealed a broad consensus that the cost of litigating in federal court
is excessive, with more than eighty percent of the responding
lawyers-who represent plaintiffs, defendants, or both-agreeing that
litigation in federal court is too expensive." The respondents
blamed discovery for much of the excessive costs, with the median
response estimating that discovery made up seventy percent of the
fees incurred in a typical matter." The respondents singled out
electronic discovery as a particular cost driver, although they also
recognized its effectiveness at generating responsive information.7 9
The survey also asked about the effects of these excessive litigation
costs. The respondents reported that (1) they turn away smaller cases
because they cannot be handled cost-effectively;,o (2) the cost of litigation
forces cases to settle that should not be settled based on the merits;"' and
(3) the cost of litigation is disproportionate to the value of smaller cases."
responses with a series of statements about the litigation process. See ABA SuRVEY,
supra note 29, at 32 (asking whether members "strongly agree, agree, disagree,
strongly disagree, or express no opinion"). It does not appear that the respondents
were asked to review records or conduct analysis to respond, but instead simply
provided their opinions. For example, when asked whether they agree or disagree with
the statement that "[dliscovery is too expensive" in a typical case in federal court,
respondents likely responded based on their general sense of the process. See id. at 151.
It is unlikely that respondents reviewed their bills or otherwise conducted any quantitative
analysis of how much time or legal fees they spent on discovery compared to the overall
legal fees and time spent unrelated to discovery in the litigation. Thus, the responses
appear to be quite subjective. Nonetheless, they are informative.
75. Id.
76. It is interesting to note that the two largest categories of cases that
responding plaintiffs and defendants handle are complex commercial disputes and
contracts. Id. at 21-22. This suggests that the survey results in general, and the
responses regarding active judicial case management in particular, are more relevant
to larger, more complex cases than to simple cases like prisoner's civil rights cases or
social security appeals.
77. Id. at 150.
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id. at 101, 103.
80. Id. at 9 (suggesting that access to the courts is effectively denied for smaller cases).
81. Id. at 159. More than ninety percent of respondents representing defendants
or both plaintiffs and defendants aid the cost of litigation caused them to settle
cases that should not have based on the merits. Id. at 157. Over ninety percent of
respondents in every category agreed that the cost of discovery often drove
settlement. Id. at 159.
82. Id. at 153.
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When asked about the role of active judicial management, seventy-
eight percent of respondents believed that early intervention by
judges helps to narrow the issues, and seventy-two percent agreed
that early intervention helps to limit discovery." Significantly,
seventy-three percent of all respondents believed that when a judicial
officer gets involved early and stays involved, the results are more
satisfactory to their clients." The report identifies this as "[o]ne area
of substantial agreement."
The American College of Trial Lawyers and the Institute for the
Advancement of the American Legal System also jointly conducted a
survey in 2009, which this Article will refer to as the American College
of Trial Lawyers Survey." The respondents to this survey also
strongly favored active judicial management. "Seventy-four percent
of the [respondents] said that early intervention by judges helped to
narrow the issues and [sixty-six] percent said that it helped to limit
discovery."" Seventy-one percent of respondents reported that their
clients were more satisfied with the results"8 -which, after all, is more
important than the satisfaction of the lawyers-if ajudicial officer was
involved in the matter early and frequently.
The authors of the American College of Trial Lawyers Survey
recommended that judges "have a more active role at the beginning
of a case in designing the scope of discovery and the direction and
timing of the case all the way to trial." The authors also noted that
"[a]ccording to one Fellow, 'Judges need to actively manage each
case from the outset to contain costs; nothing else will work.'"'
The American College of Trial Lawyers Survey recommends that
this increased judicial involvement occur early and often: "[e] arly
judicial involvement is important because not all cases are the same
and because different types of cases require different case
management.". The survey also stresses the necessity of initial
pretrial conferences to discuss discovery at an early stage." Further,
83. Id. at 124-25.
84. Id. at 126.
85. Id. at 11. Interestingly, the report suggests that this is an area of satisfaction
with the court system. The actual reported data do not provide any indication of
whether respondents believe that mostjudges are already actively managing their cases.
86. See generally AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAwYERs SURvEY, supra note 73, at 1.
87. Id. at 19.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 19.
92. Id.
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the survey emphasizes the importance of frequent status conferences
and the need for the parties to make periodic reports of these
conferences to the court."
These surveys suggest that the primary consumers of judicial
services-practicing trial lawyers and clients-believe that the system
works better with active judges." Surely their opinions carry
significant weight in evaluating the proper role ofjudges.
2. How judges spend their time
If judges in today's litigation environment so infrequently oversee
trials, are they substituting time spent managing the pretrial process?
It turns out that not only are trials on the decline; judges' hours in
the courtroom conducting proceedings of any nature are also
waning. Data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts show
that the federal judges' total hours on the bench in open court have
declined ten percent since 2008."
This section will examine two sources of data regarding howjudges
spend their time: data from the Western District of Pennsylvania on
motions that the parties file, and data gathered by the Federal
Judicial Center ("FJC") relating to how often judges interact with the
parties during the discovery process.
The Western District of Pennsylvania gathers data on the types of
motions filed each year. The chart below presents the data for
certain common motions from 2003 through 2013." The first
column lists the total number of motions filed. The second column
lists the number of those motions that were summary judgment
93. Id. at 21.
94. Not all the data are consistent with the ABA Survey and American College of
Trial Lawyers Survey described above. The Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") issued
the Preliminary Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules ("FJC
Report") in October 2009. FJC REPORT, supra note 16, at 1. The FJC Report found
no agreement by plaintiff or defense lawyers as to whether the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should be revised to encourage more judicial management. Id. at 67.
The FJC Report also contains other data inconsistent with the ABA and American
College of Trial Lawyers surveys. For example, the FJC Report found much lower
overall median costs of litigation-$20,000 for defendants and $15,000 for
plaintiffs-and a much lower percentage of those costs devoted to discovery-in the
twenty to twenty-seven percent range. Id. at 2; see also Reda, supra note 23, at 1088
(discussing the median costs of litigation reported by the FJC Report in relation to
the Duke Civil Litigation Conference's concern with electronic discovery).
95. Jordan M. Singer & William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An Updated Look at
Federal District Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REv. 565, 566 (2014).
96. The author thanks the Clerk's Office of the Western District of Pennsylvania
for providing these data.
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motions, followed in parentheses by the percentage of the total
motions that were summary judgment motions. The third column
lists the same figures for motions to dismiss. These two dispositive
motions are presented because they are the most time-consuming to
adjudicate. The last five columns relate to discovery: total discovery
motions, motions to compel, motions for a protective order, motions
for sanctions, and motions to extend the time for discovery.
Table 1: Motions Data from the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, 2003-13
Tota , msnwy DOM
year Nilis m.
Motion$' Jvdgmeo 1 Total GmqW 0 Sanlions 1CW
821 808
2003 9,433 607 (6%) 473 173 93 N/A
892 862
2004 9,439 586 (6%) 482 165 150 N/A
(10%) (9%)
849 1,207
2005 11,045 572 (5%) 505 196 121 272
(8%) (11%)
850 1,389
2006 11,691 571 (5%) 451 189 104 483
(7%) (12%)
686 1,385
2007 11,237 497 (4%) 432 177 70 524
(6%) (12%)
757 1,277
2008 11,755 418 (4%) 365 165 88 497
(6%) (11%)
821 1,238
2009 11,446 337 (3%) 368 158 77 478
(7%) (11%)
765 1,166
2010 11,112 378 (3%) 356 170 87 420
(7%) (10%)
616 1,050
2011 11,465 277 (2%) 327 167 71 348
(5%) (9%)
454 1,057
2012 11,650 273 (2%) 299 219 63 333
(4%) (9%)
426 968
2013 11,264 285 (3%) (4%) (9%) 293 149 61 379
The data suggest that-at least in this court-while the total
number of motions has remained fairly constant or increased over
the past eleven years, the number of motions for summary judgment
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and motions to dismiss have dropped by approximately half." Likewise,
the number of contested discovery motions seems to be trending down.
Thus, the decrease in trials has not led to a corresponding increase in
dispositive motions or contested discovery motions. Are judges already
substituting case management for presiding at trials and adjudicating
dispositive motions? While some may be, data gathered by the FJC
suggest hat the majority ofjudges are not.
In October 2009, the FJC reported results of a survey it conducted
in the Preliminary Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules ("FJC Report")." The data showed that the
courts conduct an initial conference to plan discovery and set time limits
for discovery in only about forty-five percent of cases.' After the initial
planning conference, the courts bring the parties in to monitor
discovery in only about thirteen percent of cases.'n The courts
adjudicate motions to compel or for protective orders in five to ten
percent of the cases and impose sanctions in less than five percent.'o'
Thus, the only regular involvement of judges that survey
respondents reported was in an initial discovery planning conference
and the ensuing case management order, and even those activities
were reported in less than fifty percent of the cases.102 Thereafter, in
the vast majority of cases, the court had little contact with the parties
during the discovery process, whether initiated by the parties or the court.
In sum, these data suggest that judges have not substituted active
case management for their diminished hours presiding in open
court. Given that plaintiff lawyers, defense lawyers, and clients all
report that active judicial involvement in a case lowers the cost,
97. These data come from a small sample and have not been subjected to any
formal statistical analysis. Furthermore, while the data contain the number of
motions filed, it does not reflect the number of hours that the judges (or their law
clerks) spent on these motions. Obviously, a motion for summaryjudgment requires
far more time to adjudicate than a motion to extend the time for discovery.
Likewise, the categorization of the motions is determined by the filing party's
selection from the court's electronic filing webpage-so some may be improperly
categorized. Furthermore, it does not take into account court initiated actions, such
as orders compelling attendance at a status conference. Recognizing these
limitations, the data nonetheless are interesting.
98. See generally FJC REPORT, supra note 16.
99. Id. at 13.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. It is interesting to note that the respondents to this survey seemed more
satisfied with the judges' level of involvement. The FJC Report states that the
"[r]espondents seemed relatively satisfied with current levels of judicial case
management in the federal courts." Id. at 3.
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increases the pace, and increases satisfaction with the outcome, the
data strongly support the need for a systemic change in judges'
participation in the pretrial litigation process.
3. Three exemplars
In her landmark article, Managerial judges, Professor Resnik
describes two hypothetical cases in which occurred some of the harms
leading her to oppose managerial judges.'"5 Those hypotheticals
have been criticized as unrealistic.' To provide some examples
firmly grounded in reality, this section will describe three actual cases
that represent different size litigation proceedings o5: a contract claim
with about $2 million at issue; an environmental claim with about $8
million at issue; and a tort claim seeking substantial but unquantified
damages that resembled "bet-the-company"' litigation. They were
selected to represent typical current complex federal litigation. In
addition, one of the cases presents the fees and time from the plaintiffs
perspective (although not on a contingency fee basis), and the other
two from the defense perspective, providing some balance.
These three cases, of course, provide no statistically analyzed data. At
the same time, these anecdotal accounts provide a strong real-world
sense of how attorneys spend their time and expend their clients'
resources. Furthermore, these case studies detail the points at which the
respective judges became involved, helping to demonstrate where
revisions to the process are most likely to have significant impacts.
Case 1
Case 1 was a contract claim of slightly over $2 million brought by
the buyer of a business for post-closing payments. This account
reflects the role of the buyer/plaintiff. The litigation lasted about
103. Resnik, supra note 33, at 386-87.
104. Flanders, supra note 36, at 508.
105. The three exemplar cases described in this section are actual cases and the
information in the discussion derives from two sources: (1) the pleadings, motions,
briefs, and court rulings that were filed in the cases; and (2) the invoices for legal
services for the featured party (which the author reviewed and coded to develop the
totals spent on the various categories of activity). All of the documents in the court's
docket are in the public record, but the billing information is not public. Under these
circumstances, citations to the record information would be inappropriate, as such
citations would link the billing information in this Article to the specific party involved in
the case, effectively disclosing the party's confidential information. Accordingly, while
the descriptions of the exemplar cases are factual descriptions of actual events and
the associated costs, they are not accompanied by citations to record information.
106. In the legal world, any litigation that potentially jeopardizes a company is
often referred to as "bet-the-company" litigation or high-stakes business litigation.
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two and a half years, and the plaintiffs legal fees totaled $383,596
plus expenses of $43,161 (not including expert fees).
For the plaintiff, the first task was drafting the complaint.
Contemporaneous with filing the complaint, the parties exchanged a
round of settlement proposals, essentially concluding a settlement
dialogue that started before the plaintiff drafted the complaint. The
defendants answered the complaint without filing any Rule 12
motions. Their answer included a counterclaim for some of the
purchase price that had been escrowed, which the plaintiff had
claimed after the dispute arose. After the pleadings closed, the court
entered a Case Management Order ("CMO") establishing deadlines
through the summary judgment stage.
The parties then commenced discovery, starting with interrogatories
and document requests among the parties and subpoenas to
nonparties. This process generated a substantial volume of paper
documents and electronically stored information ("ESI"), which
required review and privilege analysis, production of privilege logs,
and review of the documents and ESI that the defendants produced.
Approximately five months after the plaintiff filed the complaint,
the court held its first status conference. At about the same time, the
parties complied with the court's mandatory alternative dispute
resolution program by selecting mediation. They drafted mediation
statements and attended the mediation, which was unsuccessful.
Discovery continued, with further document exchanges and
depositions. Each side took seven or eight depositions. Many of the
witnesses were located in distant states, requiring travel.
Approximately ten months into the case, the defendants moved to
amend their counterclaim to assert additional causes of action. The
plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the motion was untimely
and that the amendment would be futile because the additional causes of
action failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b) (6). ' The parties briefed
the motion and the court wrote an opinion granting leave to amend.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to dismiss the new claims in the
amended counterclaim, asserting the same defense that had been the
basis for the futility argument, which the court had not reached on
the merits. At about the same time, the parties jointly proposed an
amendment to the schedule set forth in the CMO. The court held a
telephonic status conference and agreed to amend the schedule.
Following briefing, the court granted the motion to dismiss. The court
then conducted another status conference to address scheduling.
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (6).
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Throughout this time, discovery was ongoing. An issue arose
regarding one deposition, and the plaintiff moved for a protective order
contending that the deposition did not relate to an issue presently in
the case. Following letter briefs, the court granted the motion.
About sixteen months into the case, the parties shifted the
discovery focus to expert issues. The parties also engaged in another
effort to settle the case-this time informally exchanging telephone
calls and settlement proposals without any involvement by the judge
or a neutral. This effort again was unsuccessful. Accordingly, the
parties proceeded to file cross-motions for summary judgment.
About a month later, a number of disputes arose. The defendants
contended that the plaintiff had not produced certain documents.
The parties resolved this dispute informally when the plaintiff
identified the specific responsive documents it had already produced
and represented that no other known documents existed. In
addition, the plaintiff contended that one of the defendants' experts
offered opinions that were either rendered moot by the court's
dismissal of one of the defendants' counterclaims or purported to
interpret the contract language-a legal issue for the court.
Additionally, the defendants again sought to amend their answer and
counterclaim, which the court again denied. The defendants also
filed motions to amend and supplement their motion for summary
judgment. Additionally, the defendants sought to strike certain
exhibits from the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Expert
discovery continued throughout this time.
Finally, almost two years after the plaintiff filed the complaint, the
court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and
denied the defendants' motion. The defendants filed various motions
seeking some relief from the ruling, all of which were unsuccessful.
Because the contract provided for recovery of attorney's fees, the
plaintiff prepared a fee petition supported by an expert affidavit, and
the court awarded the fees set forth in the petition.
The defendants filed a notice of appeal. The parties then entered
into a settlement, which was for approximately seventy-five percent of
the total judgment, to avoid the cost and delay of appeal and the
challenges of collection from the individual defendants.
Of the $384,000 in legal fees that the plaintiff incurred in this case,
approximately $204,000 (fifty-three percent) went towards fact
discovery and $25,000 (seven percent) towards expert discovery. This
resulted in a grand total of $229,000 (sixty percent) in discovery fees.
Of the total discovery fees, $51,000 (thirteen percent) was incurred in
the summary judgment process and $39,000 (ten percent) in the
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combined motion to amend and motion to dismiss. The plaintiff also
spent $32,000 (eight percent) in fees during the settlement processes.
The plaintiff incurred only $9000 (two percent) in fees for the pleadings
and $7000 (just under two percent) for its attorney's fees petition.
The court's primary involvement was to rule on three motions: a
motion to amend the defendants' counterclaim; a motion to dismiss
portions of the counterclaim; and the parties' cross motions for
summary judgment. The court also held a small number of status
conferences to address the schedule. Aside from a couple of
discovery motions, the court had virtually no involvement in the
discovery process (where sixty percent of the fees occurred).
Although the lawyers cooperated relatively professionally in Case 1,
the process would still have been improved with active judicial
management. A routine case with no unusual circumstances
interfering with progress (interlocutory appeals, bankruptcy stays,
etc.) should not take two and a half years to get to summary
judgment. Periodic status conferences checking on progress and
clearing roadblocks would surely have helped. Likewise, the
discovery disputes might have been resolved more quickly and less
expensively through a discussion with the judge rather than formal
motion practice. Thus, while the parties did not need a heavy-
handed managerial approach, the case would have undoubtedly
proceeded more smoothly and quickly before ajudge who monitored
the matter's progress through periodic status conferences.
Case 2
Case 2 was an environmental case in which the buyer of a plant was
faced with a cleanup estimated to cost approximately $8 million. The
buyer sued the seller seeking an injunction requiring the seller to
perform the cleanup and alternatively seeking contribution towards
the cleanup costs. Each party was a large corporation with sufficient
resources and comparable amounts of documents and ESI. This
description presents the activities and costs from the defendant's
perspective and in more summary fashion than provided for Case 1.
The case proceeded for four years. After the plaintiff filed the
complaint, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss certain counts,
and in the alternative to stay the case pending the resolution of
related bankruptcy proceedings.
The court denied the motion to stay, and the parties engaged in
discovery. The parties prepared their Rule 26(f) report and met with the
judge for an initial Rule 16 conference. In this timeframe, the plaintiff
made a settlement demand, based upon which the parties agreed to try to
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mediate the dispute. They selected a mediator, prepared mediation
statements, and participated in an unsuccessful mediation.
The parties then engaged in considerable discovery. Both parties
had substantial paper documents and ESI. The parties cooperated
on the protocols for exchanging ESI. Each party sent a team of
lawyers to the other party's document repositories to inspect paper
documents. The defendant also sought considerable documents
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. 08 Each party took
eight to ten depositions, with one primary expert on each side.
After the completion of fact and expert discovery, the defendant
moved for summary judgment. The summary judgment process
included challenges to the evidence that each party submitted in
support of its position. While the motion was pending, the court
scheduled the final pretrial conference, and the parties prepared
pretrial statements. Thejudge then granted summary judgment as to
the federal statutory claims and declined to rule on the motion as it
pertained to the state law claims (or to continue to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over those claims). One of the federal
statutory claims provided for recovery of attorney's fees for the
prevailing party, so the defendant hired an expert on fees and
submitted a fee petition, which the court denied. The defendant
then filed a cost application, and the clerk's office awarded costs.
The, plaintiff refiled the state law claims in state court. The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss those claims, making the same
arguments it had advanced in its motion for summary judgment. The
state court granted the defendant's motion, ending the proceedings.
In the federal court litigation, the judge conducted an initial Rule
16 conference before entering the first CMO and a final pretrial
conference in the lead-up to trial. In between, the judge was passive,
ruling only on issues that the parties presented.
To defend the federal court litigation, the defendant incurred
$1,075,658 in fees and $88,284 in costs (not counting expert fees or
local counsel fees). Of those fees, more than half a million dollars
($547,000 or fifty-one percent) were incurred in discovery, almost
twenty percent of which was related to the experts. Much of the fees
were incurred in connection with e-discovery, including over $16,000
for technical, non-legal personnel to manipulate the electronic data.
The defendant spent $133,000 (twelve percent) on the motion for
summary judgment and related proceedings and $61,000 (six
percent) on the motion to dismiss. The fee and cost petitions
108. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
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resulted in $100,000 (nine percent) in fees. The defendant incurred
$51,000 (five percent) in the various settlement efforts.
As with Case 1, the relationship between the lawyers in Case 2 was
professional and cooperative. Similarly, Case 2 should not have taken
four years to get to summary judgment. Because the judge was
entirely passive, however, the case floundered at times. For example,
although the parties cooperated to frame a mutually acceptable
common search for ESI, the back-and-forth process took an inordinate
amount of time. That issue could likely have been ironed out in a
conference call with the court. The two Rule 16 conferences that the
court held with the parties over the four-year litigation period were
plainly insufficient to achieve the "speedy" determination of this
action. Furthermore, as time generally correlates with cost,"o' these
cases were undoubtedly more costly than was necessary.
Case 3
Case 3 was a toxic tort case with two fatalities. Although the
complaint did not specify a damages amount, the prospects of a large
jury award, potential claims by other copycat plaintiffs, and the risks
of a harmful finding about the company's core product made this
"bet-the-company" litigation for the defendant, whose perspective is
presented in this description.
This case proceeded for eleven years, although it was stayed for over
a year during an interlocutory appeal of a venue issue. The complaint
was quite lengthy-more than thirty counts-and the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss many, but not all, of the counts. The defendant then
proposed a "Lone Pine" CMO, where the parties would test the validity
of the plaintiffs' scientific causation evidence at the outset before full-
blown fact discovery. The plaintiffs vehemently opposed this procedure,
and the judge entered a traditional scheduling order.
In contrast to Cases 1 and 2, there was a considerable disparity
between the parties in the amount of discoverable information each
possessed. This disparity seemed to lead the plaintiffs to resist efforts
to narrow the scope of discovery. Accordingly, the defendant
produced 600 boxes of paper documents as well as many gigabytes of
ESI. The defendant offered to allow the plaintiffs immediate access
to the 600 boxes of documents if the plaintiffs would agree to a "claw
back" provision for any privileged documents, but the plaintiffs
declined. It took the defendant's lawyers months to conduct the
109. ABA SURVEY, supra note 29, at 148 (indicating the belief of both plaintiff and
defense lawyers that delays directly correlate to higher cost).
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privilege review and additional time to prepare the ninety-page
privilege log. It then took the plaintiffs' firm-a small office with two
partners and a small, varying number of associates and contract lawyers-
more than a year to go through the documents. The defendant rented
storage space for the entire time of both reviews to house the documents,
which had previously been stored in space that was unsuitable for legal
review. The parties also took numerous fact and expert depositions.
The lawyers did not, in general, cooperate during this contentious
litigation. Numerous discovery disputes arose during the case. The
plaintiffs challenged many of the defendant's privilege assertions,
which entailed a meet-and-confer session of several days to go
through the lengthy privilege log before formal motion practice. An
employee of the defendant sent fifty-five boxes of documents of old
financial records to the shredder during the lengthy hiatus in the
case, believing them not relevant to the litigation. Because no record
existed of the precise nature of each document, the plaintiffs filed a
spoliation sanctions motion. In conjunction with that motion, the
plaintiffs filed a motion to take the deposition of one of the lawyers
representing the defendant who had investigated the circumstances
of the document destruction. The defendant filed a motion
contending that the plaintiffs' attorney was improperly coaching
witnesses during depositions and instructing them not to answer
questions. The defendant also filed a motion to exclude from
discovery documents relating to a second plant it operated eleven
miles outside the town where the plaintiffs had lived.
After discovery concluded-eight years into the litigation-the
defendant moved to exclude the plaintiffs' experts under the Daubert
standard"o and for summary judgment based on a variety of grounds,
including lack of requisite expert testimony should the court grant
the Daubert motion. After a two-day hearing, the court excluded the
plaintiffs' specific causation expert and granted the defendant's
summary judgment motion. That ruling was upheld on appeal.
Throughout the entire eleven-year litigation, the judge was the model
passive judge. He conducted an initial status conference and thereafter
only met with the parties to adjudicate motions that the parties filed.
In defending this litigation, the defendant incurred $3,909,144 in
fees and $477,845 in costs (not counting expert fees or local counsel
110. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592, 597 (1993)
(establishing that trial judges must determine whether the expert witness will testify
to "(I) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or
determine a fact in issue," and that admissible scientific evidence must be relevant
and based on "scientifically valid principles").
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fees). Of those fees, $2,288,000 (fifty-nine percent) were incurred in
discovery, as compared to only $244,000 (six percent) on the motions
to exclude the experts and for summary judgment. The spoliation
motion alone resulted in $145,000 in fees.
The three cases described above are consistent with the survey
results indicating that the majority of litigation costs are incurred in
the discovery process, particularly in complex and high-stakes
litigation."' The case descriptions also suggest that, at least in these
three exemplars, the judges did not manage the discovery process at
all. While speed is not the only, or even most important, measure of
justice, it is certainly relevant."' All three cases would likely have
proceeded more quickly and less expensively, with no less due
process orjustice, with a managerial judge."'
Case 3 in particular demonstrates that disparities in the parties'
situations in high-stakes litigations without active and ongoing
judicial management can lead to a messy discovery process. For
example, consider the plaintiffs' refusal to enter into a claw back
agreement for the 600 boxes of documents. That caused months of
delay while the defendant conducted a privilege review, as well as
significant legal fees. At the same time, filing a formal motion on the
issue would have resulted in commensurate delay, fees in briefing the
motion, and an uncertain outcome, not to mention the judge's
displeasure at receiving another discovery motion. If the judge had been
meeting with the parties regularly, it seems likely that he could have
brokered a compromise of the issue or a more streamlined process.
4. Can the system rely on cooperation between adversaries?
As Case 3 illustrates, it may be unrealistic to expect parties in high-
stakes litigation to cooperate fully and voluntarily, particularly in the
discovery process. Our system is adversarial, with each lawyer
obligated to zealously represent her client."' In Case 3, there were
tremendous disparities between the parties. The plaintiffs had almost
111. See supra notes 73-95 and accompanying text (providing an in-depth
discussion of the survey data).
112. SeeABA SURVEY, supra note 29, at 148 (indicating that delays directly correlate
to additional cost).
113. See Peckham, supra note 50, at 257-58 (explaining the positive impacts of
active judicial management, which include increased monitoring and expediting of
cases). In contrast, Peckham notes that prior to the 1983 amendment of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, "cases were allowed to drift, and settlement often occurred
because one party could no longer tolerate the uncertainty and delay." Id. at 257.
114. See, e.g., MODEL RUES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2015) ("As advocate, a
lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system.").
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no paper documents and very modest ESI from the plaintiffs' personal
email accounts, while the defendant had substantial paper and
electronic records. The plaintiffs were represented on a contingency fee
basis, while the defendant was represented on an hourly basis. Under
these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the parties had widely
disparate views about how discovery should proceed-the plaintiffs
wanted unrestricted extensive discovery, and the defendant viewed
discovery as costly and only likely to increase its litigation risks.
In every case pending in federal court, discovery must be scaled on
both a macro and micro level."' On the macro scale, issues like the
length of the discovery period, any alterations to the default limits on
the number of discovery requests, and the manner in which
electronic discovery is handled must be set at the outset, then adjusted
as needed as the case progresses."6 The parties typically address these
issues in the Rule 26(f) report to the judge, either reporting
agreement on a joint proposal or their individual positions."' The
judge then sets these parameters in the initial CMO."'
On the micro scale, the rules place the initial burden on the parties to
ensure that each discovery request is proportional: the propounding
party has a duty to serve discovery that meets this balancing test, and the
responding party may object to discovery it perceives as out of
balance."' Although the rules permit judges to impose proportionality
limits sua sponte, in practice, judges only get involved if the parties file a
motion to compel or for a protective order.120
Under the current rules, in a case on a passive judge's docket like
those in the exemplar cases, the parties perform this macro and
micro scaling, with the judge's involvement being only to break
impasses that the parties present. Professor John Setear wrote an
115. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in
Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 769 n.16 (2010) (acknowledging criticisms of
the micro- and macro-level costs of discovery and litigation).
116. See id. at 766-67 (explaining that, because the existing discovery rules do not
identify contested issues early on, discovery is expansive and, therefore, costly, and
stating that e-discovery "needs a serious overhaul" (quoting AMERIcAN COLLEGE OF
TRIAL LAWYERS SURVEY, supra note 73, at 2)).
117. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (providing the procedures for party conferences and
planning discovery).
118. See FED. R Civ. P. 16(b) (3) (noting the application of case management orders to
discovery parameters, in terms of the required and permitted contents of the orders).
119. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b) (1), (b) (2) (C) (iii) (specifying both the scope and
limits of discovery and the role of the court-on its own or by motion-to limit the
extent of discovery in certain circumstances).
120. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (2) (C) (iii) (providing that, "on motion or on its own,
the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery if" certain scenarios occur).
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article applying game theory to the positions that parties must take in
this discovery process."' He likened discovery to a "prisoners'
dilemma" problem. In the classic prisoners' dilemma scenario, each
prisoner is incentivized individually to make the decision that seems
to minimize his jail time.' This individual incentive perspective
leads each prisoner to make a decision with an outcome that is less
favorable than the outcome he might achieve if both prisoners
cooperated. Setear argues that the federal rules and litigation
structure incentivize parties to maximize their own individual
advantage by propounding disproportionate, "impositional"
discovery, at the expense of the overall process.'2 3
Litigators are highly motivated to win cases. Winning is good for
an attorney's retention of existing clients, attraction of new clients,
and reputation in the legal community. Attorneys who are even
marginally competent will realize that there are tactical advantages to
certain outcomes in the discovery process.12"
121. See generally Setear, supra note 13.
122. In the classic prisoners' dilemma, two defendants are separated. Id. at 576.
Each is told that if he "squeals" while his co-defendant does not, he will go free, and
the co-defendant will receive a sentence of eight years. Id. If both squeal, both will
receive sentences of five years. Id. If neither squeals, they will each receive sentences
of two years. Id. So each prisoner considering his own interest will conclude that he
is better off squealing; if the co-defendant squeals, then by squealing himself the
prisoner reduces his sentence from eight years to five years. Id. at 577. And if the co-
defendant does not squeal, then the prisoner goes free by squealing. Id. This leads
them both to squeal and serve five-year sentences, when they could have served two-
year sentences if they both refrained from squealing. Id. at 578.
123. Discovery requests are sometimes divided into "normal" discovery-which we
can think of as discovery where the objective is gaining information that will help the
propounding party win the case-and "impositional" discovery-which we can think
of as discovery designed to impose a burden on the opposing party, seeking to cause
the opposing party to change its settlement position. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra
note 13, at 637-38 (stating that an "impositional request" is justified by additional
costs to one's opponent, instead of the gains obtained from requested information);
Setear, supra note 13, at 581-82 (describing the "impositional benefits" one may
derive from imposing costs on the responding party). Discovery sometimes has
elements of both normal and impositional objectives. The information sought might
be helpful in establishing or defending the claims at issue, but the propounding
party might also recognize that there is some benefit in imposing an additional
burden on the opposing party.
124. See Peckham, supra note 50, at 256 ("Attorneys, trained in the traditional
adversarial system, continued to believe that serving their clients effectively required
them, in many instances, to attempt to manipulate the discovery rules to frustrate
and subvert the opposing party."); see also E. Donald Elliott, Managerial judging and
the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 306, 308 (1986) ("Our current system of
civil litigation creates perverse incentives for lawyers, and then relies on judges to
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As seen in Case 3, a lawyer representing an individual suing a
corporation will realize that electronic discovery is typically more
likely to uncover relevant evidence from the corporate party than
discovery of paper documents.125 Electronic discovery is also likely to
be far more burdensome to the corporation than to the individual.'2 1
Thus, the attorney representing the individual will be more likely to
push for extensive electronic discovery, motivated by the evidentiary,
"normal" aspect of the discovery, but cognizant of the "impositional"
aspect as well. Asking that lawyer to ignore the tactical impositional
advantages of more extensive electronic discovery is simply not
realistic and might even be a violation of an attorney's ethical
obligation to be zealous in some circumstances.'2 7
If we consider other high-stakes contested processes, it is rare that
we would ask the participants to regulate or referee themselves. In a
pickup basketball game on the playground, for example, the players
might self-regulate, calling their own fouls and other violations. In
professional league finals, however, we would not dream of asking the
players to officiate themselves-the NBA and WNBA use the most
skilled and experienced referees to adjudicate their highest stakes
contests. These leagues use referees not because they have
concluded that the players are cheaters or uncooperative, but rather
because it is simply irrational to expect them police themselves when
the passions and stakes are so high.
It is similarly irrational to expect attorneys to referee themselves in
high-stakes federal court litigation. Again, this conclusion does not
depend on whether the attorneys are operating in good faith within
police litigant behavior through techniques like managerial judging. If we are not
satisfied with the results, we should redesign the system to provide direct incentives
for appropriate behavior."); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the
Federal Rules-and the Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law judging, 36 Sw. U. L. REV.
191, 213 (2007) (noting that litigators occasionally require judicial "adult
supervision" to foster pretrial cooperation).
125. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 29, at 101 (reporting that about eighty-nine
percent of plaintiffs' attorneys believe that electronic discovery enhances their ability
to discover all relevant information).
126. Id. at 108 (reporting that around eighty-five percent of defense attorneys
consider electronic discovery disproportionately burdensome).
127. See Thornburg, supra note 64, at 1269 (concluding that many lawyers are not
effective case managers because of their self-interest (hourly billing), risk-averse
nature (worried that they might miss key evidence if they do not turn over every
discovery stone), and strategic actions (creating settlement leverage through
impositional discovery)). Consequently, Thornburg notes that judges are better
suited to make decisions that serve the collective interests of the clients, taxpayers,
and other users of the court system. Id.
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the rules or whether they are good, ethical people. The Rules of Civil
Procedure, and perhaps the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,'2 "
prohibit purely impositional discovery and endorse purely normal
discovery, but there is a wide swath of gray area between those two
ends of the spectrum. It is in this gray area that the adversarial
nature of litigation trumps complete cooperation.
No one disagrees that the judge serves the role of referee in civil
litigation-those opposing managerial judges do not contend that
the judge should not resolve disputes that the parties present. The
question is whether the judge should make rulings only when the
parties formally present their disagreements or should monitor the
proceedings and intervene whenever the judge thinks it appropriate.
In other words, in Case 3, should the judge have actively monitored
the discovery process and taken additional measures to make the
process more efficient and less combative once he recognized that
the parties were not cooperating well and did not trust each other?
Professor Bone analogized managing litigation to managing a
workplace.'29 Imagine a manager trying to supervise "a workplace
where the employees are committed to achieving diametrically
opposite results, encouraged to pursue their own self-interest and not
the interest of the firm ... and allowed to use a wide range of
strategic tools to achieve their ends."" Under such conditions, Bone
observed, "Even the best manager is likely to have great difficulty
managing such a fractious workplace environment.""'
Suppose you are in charge of hiring the manager in Bone's
analogy. One candidate announces that he has a laissez-faire approach
to managing, and intends to stay in his office and only evaluate whether
the employees are working towards the overall good of the company if
they come to him with problems. The other candidate states that she
takes a proactive approach to managing and communicates regularly
with the employees to make sure everything is running smoothly to
advance the company's welfare. Most people would hire the proactive
manager under the working conditions in Bone's workplace.
Managing adversarial lawyers is a lot like managing Bone's
employees; however, under the current rules and judges' current
practices, most judges are like the passive, laissez-faire manager. Rule
128. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr r. 3.4(d) (AM' BAR Ass'N 2015)
(prohibiting unnecessary discovery requests and the failure to make a reasonable
effort to respond to proper requests).





16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes, but does not
require, judges to conduct a pretrial conference prior to issuing the
initial CMO.132 The FJC Report suggests that judges only hold such
pretrial conferences about forty-five percent of the time.'3 3 Thus, in
more than half of the cases, the judge sets all of the parameters for
the discovery process without meeting with or speaking to the parties,
and likely with very little knowledge about the nature of the case and
the issues likely to arise. 134
Europe has a litigation system where the judges and the lawyers
jointly participate in a search for the truth.'3 5 They have very little
discovery, and it is conducted incrementally and with the active
participation of the judge.' 36  In the United States, in contrast,
discovery is a set of tools used by each party to develop its own case
and to contest the opponent's case-an integral part of winning or
losing.'13  Without abandoning the fundamentally adversarial role of
the litigators in our system, it is naive to think that lawyers will wear
blinders during the pretrial process, blocking out the tactical
opportunities available during discovery and the financial and other
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a). The only change to these provisions in the 2015
amendments was to shorten the time for the judge to issue the scheduling order and
to provide that, if the judge conducts a pretrial conference for the purpose of
framing the scheduling order, the judge should do so in a manner that allows for
"direct simultaneous communication" between the parties, rather than by email or
other non-concurrent means. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1)(B), (b)(2) (amendments
effective Dec. 1, 2015); COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., SUMMARY OF THE REPORT
OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app.
B-12 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/
reports-judicial-conference-september-2014 (explaining that the provision in Rule
16(b)(1)(B) that pretrial conferences can be held through mail or telephone was
deleted to promote real-time communication).
133. FJC REPORT, supra note 16, at 13.
134. In contrast, Rule 26(f) requires the parties to meet and confer to prepare the
discovery report that judges typically use as the starting point for their scheduling
orders. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). Where the drafters of the federal rules hesitate to tell
judges what they must do, they show no such reticence when it comes to telling the
parties what they must do.
135. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the judge in Civil Law
Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1019-20 (1998).
136. Steven Baicker-McKee, Discovery: Legal Aspects, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 516, 521 (James D. Wright ed.,
Elsevier, 2d ed. 2015).
137. See id. at 517 (implying that broad, extensive discovery is necessary due to the
notice and pleading standard in U.S. federal courts); see also James F. Herbison,
Corporate Reps in Deps: To Exclude or Not to Exclude, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1521, 1524
(2000) (intimating that discovery is the process that bridges the pleading stage and
the summaryjudgment or trial stage of litigation).
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rewards attendant to winning their cases. Returning to Professor
Setear's game theory analysis, we either need to change the rules of
the game to incentivize the participants to use discovery to advance
overall effectiveness and efficiency, or we need the judge to manage
the process actively to advance those goals.'"
B. Responding to the Criticisms
The concerns about active judges are certainly legitimate, but can be
addressed. This section will address the most common of those concerns.
1. Transparency
One of Professor Resnik's primary concerns was that a judge's
activities during the pretrial process might occur off the record, less
subject to public scrutiny or appellate review.'" While off-the-record
conferences and actions are undeniably less transparent and
reviewable, there is a simple solution to this concern: require most or
all conferences to be on the record."' Manyjudges already conduct
most of their status conferences on the record, and there is no reason
the Rules could not require conferences to be on the record, perhaps
with exceptions for settlement conferences with the parties' consent.
Of course, it will still be extremely difficult to persuade an
appellate court to overturn a trial judge's managerial actions, even if
captured word-for-word on the record."' It is important to
recognize, though, that pretrial rulings on contested motions by
passive judges are also difficult to appeal; they are subject to the same
abuse of discretion standard."' Similarly, outcomes that result from
the parties' agreements or default conditions that result from the
parties' inability to compromise are not subject to appeal at all.
For example, consider the issue of the number of depositions, set
by default at ten per side."' In a case before a passive, non-
managerial judge, if the plaintiff wants more than ten depositions
from the defendant who does not consent, the plaintiff must either
138. See Setear, supra note 13, at 616-17, 631-32.
139. Resnik, supra note 33, at 378.
140. Peckham, supra note 50, at 263.
141. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (stating that reviewing
courts examine discretionary decisions of the trial court only for abuse of discretion).
142. See, e.g., Gov't of Ghana v. ProEnergy Servs., LLC, 677 F.3d 340, 344 (8th Cir.
2012) (noting that appellate courts review discovery rulings in a "narrow and
deferential" way, and the appellate court will not reverse such rulings "absent a gross
abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness").
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a) (2) (A) (i).
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file a motion with the court or decide that the issue is "not worth the
candle" and live with the ten depositions. The judge's ruling on the
motion to enlarge the number of depositions is technically subject to
appeal, but is virtually impossible to overturn. "' If the plaintiff
decides to live with the default limit, there is no ruling to appeal.
If the same case were proceeding before an active, managerial
judge, the judge would engage in some dialog with the parties
regarding the number of depositions appropriate for the case at an
initial scheduling conference. The plaintiff would advocate for a
higher limit, and the judge would either agree or disagree, setting the
limit in the initial CMO. The judge's managerial ruling would be on
the record and technically subject to appeal, but would be virtually
impossible to overturn just like the ruling on the discovery motion
before the passive judge."
In short, the vast majority of the pretrial process entails intensely
discretionary decisions that are virtually immune from appeal,
whether decided by an active judge, a passive judge, or the parties.
Appealability, therefore, is not a compelling reason to condemn
active judges so long as all proceedings are on the record.
The above scenario does illustrate, however, how much more
sensible the process is when the judge schedules an initial conference
and takes an active role in managing the case. If the parties come to
the conference with an agreement on the appropriate number of
depositions, the judge is quite likely to use that number in the CMO.
If the parties cannot agree, then an exchange at the conference is
much more efficient and less costly than formal motion practice, and
there is no reason to conclude that a formally briefed motion would
produce a different, much less better, result. Assuming the
conference is on the record, the judge's decision is transparent and
subject to appellate review comparable to that for an order issued
following a formal motion.
An additional measure to address this concern-albeit one this
Article does not advocate-is to require judges to articulate explicitly
the basis for their rulings."' With such a requirement, judges' case
144. Sw, e.g., O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 636 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying
the "abuse of discretion" standard of review to rulings that adjust the deposition limits).
145. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (observing the standard of
review is the same in either situation).
146. See Thornburg, supra note 64, at 1322 (examining the potentially clarifying
effect that detailed, reasoned, and published managerial orders and decisions might
have on the appeal process). However, any possible benefit might be undermined
because the decisions: (1) might be too factually-specific to represent helpful
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management rulings would more easily be subject to scrutiny by the
parties, the public, and appellate courts.
2. Improper settlement pressure
Another concern is that managerial judges will try to coerce parties
into settling cases."' It is not clear how frequently such coercion
occurs, but survey data suggest that it does not occur in the majority
of cases and that defendants report experiencing such coercion more
frequently than plaintiffs."'
Few would defend the judge's coercive tactics described in
Professor Resnik's hypothetical-postponing ruling on a substantive
ruling while at the same time advising the parties that the court would
be unhappy if the case did not settle, and then requiring the parties to
attend multiple settlement conferences. "' At the same time, it is a
mistake to equate active case management with settlement strong-arm
tactics. Judges have many powers that are subject to beneficial use, but
also subject to abuse. The preferable approach is to discourage and
police the abuse, not divest judges of discretionary powers.
A starting point is to change the metrics we use to evaluate
judges-the current metrics arguably incentivize the coercive
behavior that Resnik describes. The metrics that the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts uses to evaluate judges primarily measure
speed and volume of case resolution-how many cases a judge
resolves in each period and how long cases have been on the judge's
docket. 0̀ Of course, the speed at which a judge adjudicates cases is
important, but it is only one small measure of a judge's overall
effectiveness-it does not take into account accuracy and cost-
effectiveness of resolution, satisfaction of the lawyers or parties, or
patterns without developing extensive case law; (2) would not communicate how
effective the trial plan actually was; and (3) would not afford any opportunity to
evaluate the effectiveness of the trial plan. Id.
147. See Resnik, supra note 33, at 390 (suggesting that active, directorial judges might
maneuver for a particular outcome by discussing with litigants the high costs, risks, and
length of trials, as well as sharing personal opinions about potential outcomes).
148. ABA SURVEY, supra note 29, at 130 (reporting that twenty-three percent of
plaintiffs' lawyers and forty percent of defendants' lawyers agree or strongly agree
with the statement that "[j]udges inappropriately pressure parties to settle cases").
149. Resnik, supra note 33, at 390.
150. William G. Young & Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a More Complete
Model ofFederalDistrict Court Productivity, 118 PA. ST. L. REv. 55, 57 (2013) (explaining
that "court 'productivity' studies focus nearly exclusively on timeliness measures,
such as the time from case filing to disposition or the number of motions that are
not resolved within six months").
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any broad measure of justice.'" More importantly for this purpose,
the pressures from this speed-oriented metric may cause some judges
to coerce cases to settle in an effort to improve their statistics.'15
Part of the solution, again, is not to abandon the notion of active
judges, but rather to use better metrics for evaluating judges, or at
least to place less emphasis on speed and volume when evaluating
effectiveness. Judge William Young and ProfessorJordan Singer have
proposed a metric they term "bench presence," which measures the
time a judge sits on the record with the parties.' They include
arguments and conferences on the record as well as trials in their
evaluation, reasoning that bench presence is a good proxy for
fairness because it promotes four values: "(1) opportunities for
participation and voice; (2) the neutrality of the forum; (3) the
trustworthiness of legal authorities; and (4) the degree to which
people are treated with dignity and respect."'15  They favor time when
the judge is sitting in the courtroom, but also include proceedings in
chambers, so long as they are on the record.'5
While bench presence may not be the perfect or only metric for
evaluating judges,'" the point is that our current metric of volume
and speed of adjudication measures only one aspect of a judge's
effectiveness, and may prompt some judges to coerce parties to settle.
The solution is to change the metric, not to prohibit judges from
managing cases on their dockets.
The other part of the solution is to take measures that discourage judges
from exerting excessive settlement pressure. Conducting all proceedings
on the record should largely curb improper settlement pressure, but the
151. See id. (denouncing measurement of productivity that only considers the
speed at which a district court can dispose of cases); Steven S. Gensler & Lee H.
Rosenthal, Measuring the Quality offudging: It All Adds Up to One, 48 NEW ENG. L. REv.
475, 475 (2014) (arguing that measuring productivity of district courts in terms of a
judge's speed does not account for the quality of ajudge's work).
152. See Resnik, supra note 33, at 390 (entertaining a hypothetical situation
typifying ways in which ajudge might pressure litigants to settle their claims).
153. Young & Singer, supra note 150, at 58 (proffering "bench presence" as a
better measurement ofjudicial productivity because it takes into account procedural
fairness, reorients the focus back on a judge's main function of managing trials and
hearings, and can be measured directly and easily).
154. Id. at 80.
155. Id. at89 (calling proceedings in chambers the "weak form" of bench presence).
156. For example, bench presence might have the unintended effect of
incentivizing judges to schedule unnecessary proceedings or to prolong necessary
proceedings in order to enhance their bench presence measures.
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rules of procedure or judicial conduct could certainly be amended to
address, or potentially eliminate, the judges' role in settlement. "'
A potential corollary to the concern that managerial judges will
exert excessive settlement pressure is that more cases would settle as a
result, exacerbating the decreasing trend in the number of cases that
go to trial.'" This argument confuses pretrial management with
pretrial resolution. Case management is not inconsistent with the notion
of jury trials and should not be anathema to those who bemoan the
decrease in jury trials. Judge Young, a strong proponent of jury trials,
wrote that requiring one to choose between jury trials and active judicial
management is a false choice: "Case management is not an end in itself
but a means to other ends, and one of those ends is trial."'"
One of the potential causes of the decline in trials is the cost of
litigation (and in particular the discovery process);'60 so, by making
the litigation process more efficient and cost effective, judicial
management might actually increase the number of trials. If parties
know that the judge will actively manage their case to eliminate
unnecessary cost and delay, they might be more willing to slog
through the pretrial process and proceed to trial.
3. Lack of partiality
Exposing a judge to the parties and their arguments during the
pretrial process, critics of managerial judging argue, would remove
157. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could prohibit the judge
who is handling a case from conducting any settlement discussions-a magistrate
judge or a different Article III judge could handle them. Similarly, the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges could be amended to more explicitly spell out
what is and is not appropriate in a settlement conference.
158. See, e.g., Kent D. Syverud, ADR and the Decline of the American Civil jury, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1935, 1935 (1997) (suggesting that the decrease in number of cases that
go to trial is due, in part, to a defective civil jury trial system); see also Stanley Marcus,
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, "Wither the Jury Trial," Speech
Before the National Conference of Law Reviews (Mar. 13, 2008), in 21 ST. THOMAS L. REv.
27, 28, 30 (2008) (positing thatjury trials are the bedrock of the rule of law because they
allow the public to both observe and participate in the judicial process).
159. Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 151, at 484; see William G. Young, An Open
Letter to U.S. District judges, FED. LAW., July 2003, at 32-33 (clarifying that his
argument does not go to either extreme of maligning the jury trial process or
denigrating the judicial role).
160. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (concluding
that "cost-conscious defendants" will be forced by the cost of discovery to "settle even
anemic cases" before reaching summary judgment proceedings); ABA SURVEY, supra
note 29, at 2 (finding that eighty-one percent of respondents felt litigation is too
expensive, while eighty-two percent felt discovery in particular is too expensive).
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the blindfold from LadyJustice and improperly influence the judge's
rulings.'"' This may be the weakest criticism of managerial judges.
Good, impartial judges should be "blind" (or impartial) toward the
specific parties in the case, not ignorant of the facts or the parties'
arguments. In other words, we do not want judges making particular
rulings because they know one party or have personal biases about
the parties, but we do want judges making rulings informed by the
facts and the parties' arguments.'12  Judges are often exposed to
inadmissible evidence at trial, just as they might be in the pretrial
process. 63 They must set aside their biases at all stages of the
process-at trial as well as in the pretrial processes.' Judges are
exposed to the parties' arguments, to contested evidence, and to other
facts and allegations about the case in motions to dismiss, jurisdictional
challenges, disputed discovery motions, motions in limine, and motions
for summary judgment. There is no principled difference in the effect
on a judge's neutrality or "blindness" between these events-that even
the most passive judge must adjudicate-and a Rule 16 conference
conducted on the record by an active judge. In other words, there is
nothing inherent in the process of actively managing a lawsuit that
renders the judge incapable of remaining fair or impartial.
4. judicial training
Critics of judicial management have further observed that judges
are not chosen or trained to be managers."' This is another
important point, but one that does not militate restricting judges to
presiding over trials. Quite the opposite, it militates changing the
criteria by which we selectjudges and the way we train them.
As outlined above, unless we fundamentally restructure our civil
litigation system, only a tiny portion of the cases that are filed go to
trial. Should we select judges based on their skill at evidentiary
objections and send them to judge's school to learn the finer points
of conducting a trial so they can preside over the one percent of cases
that make it that far in the process? Or should we broaden our
161. See Resnik, supra note 33, at 383 (explaining that Lady Justice's blindfold
represents the idea that justice is fair and impartial, and cannot be influenced or
corrupted the way ordinary people can).
162. See Flanders, supra note 36, at 520 (arguing that many of the rulings judges
make are better shaped by context, such as relevance rulings).
163. Id.
164. Peckham, supra note 50, at 262-63.
165. Bone, supra note 63, at 1963 (observing that scholars have historically
overlooked the fact that there is no empirical support for the proposition that trial
judges can effectively modify and adopt trial procedures on a case-by-case basis).
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criteria to emphasize selecting judges who have the background and
temperaments to manage cases well and then train them in case
management? Unless and until the realities of trial frequency in the
federal court system change significantly, case management should
be the primary component of the selection and training of judges,
although, of course, not to the exclusion of trial skills.
5. judges lack the necessary information
A concern related to judicial training is whether judges have the
information necessary to make appropriate decisions regarding issues
like proportionality.'66 When the parties come before the court for
the initial scheduling conference, the judge knows very little about
the case."' Meanwhile, the parties are incentivized to distort or
exaggerate the circumstances to support their preferences." This is
another important concern, but it weighs not in favor of less active
management, but in favor of more ongoing active management.
The hypothetical above where the plaintiff sought to expand the
number of depositions allowed by the Rules illustrates this point
nicely.'" The active judge scheduled a Rule 16 conference prior to
issuing a CMO. At the conference, the plaintiff advocated for a
higher limit, and the defendant advocated against increasing it. If
the judge concluded that she did not have enough information about
the dispute and the sources of evidence to make an informed
balancing of the benefits and burdens of the additional depositions-
a proportionality ruling-she could set an initial limit in the CMO
while reserving the option to adjust the limit after assessing the
effectiveness of the initial depositions. The judge could return to the
topic at conferences conducted as discovery progressed, asking the
parties to explain what depositions had already occurred and what
their positions were at that time regarding the need for additional
depositions. The parties might be in a position at that point to agree
166. See Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 638-39 (stating that judges' ability to detect
and discourage impositional discovery requests is limited because the judge knows
less than the parties, and the parties themselves often do not know details about their
cases until after discovery); see also Elliott, supra note 124, at 331 (noting that
potential benefits of managerial judging hinge on the extent and accuracy of a
judge's understanding of a particular case); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and
Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROoK. L. REv. 761, 793 (1993)
(acknowledging that judges may not have sufficient understanding of a case to
exercise full and complete control over a case).
167. Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 638.
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (elaborating on the hypothetical).
390 [Vol. 65:353
RECONCEPTUALIZING MANAGERIALJUDGES
on the need for additional depositions or they might still need the
judge to make a ruling. If so, the judge's ultimate ruling would be
based on this new and better information.
Keep in mind that not only is the judge lacking in information
critical to making nuanced proportionality assessments at the outset
of the case, but the parties typically lack that information as well.
Each party must speculate about what information the other has, and
may press for discovery that is not cost effective for either party simply
because of the vague possibility that the discovery might turn up
important evidence. An ongoing fluid process, captained by an active
judge, allows all of the stakeholders to adjust as additional
information becomes available.
In other words, no one-neither the judge nor the parties-is in a
position to make fully informed decisions about proportionality and
the various other pretrial issues that arise at the outset of a case when
nothing more than the contents of the pleadings is known. A pretrial
process that facilitates adjustment over the course of the litigation-
active ongoing judicial case management-is inherently more likely
to get things right than a pretrial process that makes static decisions
at fixed junctures-passive judicial adjudication.
6. judicial discretion is bad
Perhaps the most troubling concern about active judicial case
management is the notion that giving judges discretion is a bad thing.
Professor Tidmarsh expressly opined that vesting judges with
discretion leads to "expense, delay, unpredictability, and abuse of
power."' Each instance where a judge may exercise discretion, in
Tidmarsh's view, has the potential to interfere with the resolution of
the case on the merits,"' and, therefore, should be avoided because
of inevitable expense and delay.'7 2
170. Tidmarsh, supra note 60, at 558.
171. Id. Part of the problem may be the attitude that resolution of a case on the
merits is the only successful outcome of the litigation process. Certainly, a trial on
the merits is an essential component of the litigation process, and any procedure or
process that forces parties to settle or abandon their claims is problematic. But
settlement is the right outcome for many disputes, and any set of rules or principles
that discourages settlement or views it as a uniformly bad outcome is misguided. We
do not want parties to settle cases because the judge has coerced them or because the
litigation process is so burdensome or expensive that they abandon their claims or
defenses, but we do want them to settle when an appropriate compromise is
available. See Jean Xiao, Heuristics, Biases, and Consumer Litigation Funding at the
Bargaining Table, 68 VAND. L. REV. 261, 263, 287 (2015) (intimating that litigants may
reject reasonable settlement offers when they have an inaccurate understanding of
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Although not stated as overtly by other scholars, the notion that
judicial discretion is at odds with justice is an undercurrent in much of
the opposition to active judges. Professor Resnik's concern that judges
will coerce settlements is, at its heart, a concern that if we give judges the
discretion to manage cases, they will abuse that discretion by strong-
arming parties into settlements that they would otherwise not accept. "
This lack of trust in judges to exercise discretion justly and
appropriately implicates issues much more profound than how active
or managerial our judges are-it signals a lack of faith in the entire
judicial system. Judges, whether active or passive, must exercise
discretion throughout the litigation process. Virtually every discovery
issue, for example, is discretionary. Whether a discovery issue comes
before a passive judge on a contested motion or arises in a discovery
dialog initiated by an active judge, its resolution will require
discretion. Likewise, many trial rulings are discretionary." To take
discretion out of judges' job descriptions would require an entirely
new judicial employee handbook.
Right now, judges have almost unfettered liberty to manage the
cases on their dockets.175 Our current rules do not require active case
management, but they certainly allow it; ajudge may hold as many or
as few conferences as she pleases and may raise almost any issue at
those conferences."' An active judge with the predilections that
cause the concerns discussed in this Article has ample opportunities
to act on those predilections. Conversely, a passive judge may sit
quietly on the sidelines while a case flounders wastefully and
ineffectively. It is easy to imagine scenarios where active judges cause
harm, but it is equally easy to imagine scenarios where a judge's
laissez-faire approach causes it.
the costs and benefits of settling and going to trial).
172. Tidmarsh, supra note 60, at 558.
173. See Resnik, supra note 33, at 425 (discussing a hypothetical case in which the
presiding judge attempted to induce the parties to settle by holding separate meetings,
challenging the parties' arguments, and proposing specific settlement figures).
174. Balancing the probative value of evidence against the prejudicial value under
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is one example. See FED. R. EviD. 403.
175. See, e.g., Smith v. Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014)
(recognizing that district courts' authority to manage their dockets and individual
cases is "unquestionable" and "broad"), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1417 (2015); Grayson v.
O'Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (finding that the "notoriously
crowded dockets" of federal district courts necessitate significant autonomy and
control on the judges' part over their dockets).
176. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(a) (authorizing pretrial conferences and placing no
limitation on the number of conferences a judge may schedule or the topics that a
judge may address at the conferences).
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The fact that a judge may not exercise discretion perfectly is not a
reason to limit judges to non-discretionary tasks. As fallible humans,
we must expect that judges will exercise their discretion imperfectly
(and perhaps sometimes with motives of which we do not approve).
However, if we cannot trust the majority of our judges to exercise
their judgment competently and in good faith, then our system needs
much more than a decision on active versus passive judges. If we do
not trust ourjudges, we need to change the way we choose, train, and
monitor them-not strip them of all discretionary powers.
C. A Call for Mandatory Ongoing Interaction
Incompetence and malfeasance aside, some cases will proceed
better with active management by the judge, and some cases will
proceed satisfactorily, or even better, without active management.
Distinguishing these two categories requires-of course-a judge to
exercise discretion. There are many circumstances that might flag a
case that will require more active management: significant
discrepancies between the parties' resources; one party having
significantly more ESI than the other; delay being particularly
disadvantageous to one party; a lack of cooperation between the
parties; fee shifting provisions such as that found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
and the significance of the stakes, among other things.
The question is, how does the judge determine whether a case will
proceed better with active management, and if so, the optimal level
and type of management? It seems obvious that judges cannot make
this determination accurately in the isolated confines of their
chambers. Rather, judges must gain some understanding of the
dynamics of each case. The optimal tool for gathering the necessary
information is already in the Rules-conferences under Rule 16.',n
The data suggest, however, thatjudges are not using this tool.'7 8 In
more than half of the cases, the judge did not even conduct an initial
Rule 16 conference before entering the CMO.'" Thus, despite the
fact that survey data strongly advocate a more efficient and
satisfactory process through more active judicial involvement,'"8 0 the
majority of judges are simply defaulting to passive case management
without any consideration of case particulars.'8 '
177. Id. (allowing the court to schedule unlimited pretrial conferences to address
any relevant topic or learn more about a particular case).
178. FJC REPORT, supra note 16, at 13.
179. FJC REPORT, supra note 16, at 13.
180. ABA SuRvEY, supra note 29, at 126.
181. Id.
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Given the underutilization of Rule 16 conferences to shape the
pretrial process, the Rules need to be amended to require more
interaction between judges and the parties, or at least to set more
interaction as the default-permitting and merely encouraging more
interaction has proven ineffective."' That is not to say that the Rules
should mandate micromanagement. Rather, the Rules should
mandate enough interaction that the judge can assess the proper
amount ofjudicial management. If the judge's interactions with the
parties persuade the judge that the parties are fully capable of
managing the process themselves and are proceeding appropriately,
the judge can make an informed decision to stay out of the way. But it
should be an informed decision after some interaction with the parties,
and the judge should monitor the case as it proceeds to ensure that it
is proceeding appropriately without the judge's assistance.
The precise form and frequency of these interactions should be
flexible, since we have one set of rules that is applicable to cases of all
shapes and sizes. At a minimum, the judge should be required to
conduct an initial Rule 16 conference prior to issuing the initial
CMO and another conference at the end of fact discovery. These
junctures are the major planning and shaping points of the process.
Periodic conferences during discovery for all but the simplest cases
with the lowest stakes and very short discovery periods would yield
additional time and cost-saving benefits.
These conferences could be in person or by telephone, depending
on the lawyers' locations and the nature of the case and conference,
but they should not be by email or written submission. This real-time
exchange requires the judge to engage with the lawyers and take
some action, even if the outcome is a simple statement to the effect
that "things seem to be going fine, carry on."
Additionally, the judge should conduct a conference when a party
is planning to file a contested motion. Many judges already have
182. A variant on this proposal would be to give either party the right to request
that the judge conduct regular conferences and require the judge to do so upon
such a request. Under this approach, if any party feels that the process is not
working optimally, it can trigger greater judicial involvement. Conversely, if all
parties believe that they are proceeding appropriately and do not need the judge's
oversight and management, they can forego their right to request greater judicial
involvement. At the same time, the judge would retain the discretion to conduct any
conferences she deems appropriate, even if the parties do not request additional
judicial involvement. This approach entails a risk that some judges might disfavor
requests for regular conferences and might discourage the party from making the
request. Ultimately, though, we need to trust judges to conduct their duties with
integrity and in good faith.
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practices along these lines. For example, the Southern District of
New York implemented a pilot program that required such
conferences.'8 3 At the pre-motion conference, the judges may discuss
the nature of the motion and their preliminary reactions and thoughts
about it. That process has the potential to focus and streamline the
briefing and even to eliminate the motion altogether if either party
concludes it is likely to lose. For discovery motions, the judges could
also explore the nature and extent of the parties' meet and confer as
required by Rules 26 and 37 to confirm that it was meaningful.'
For example, suppose one party is planning to file a summary
judgment motion. At the pre-motion conference, the judge might
ask the parties to explain their positions. If the judge thought that
one factual issue seemed to be genuinely disputed, the judge might ask
the moving party how it planned to demonstrate that there was no
dispute as to that issue. That dialog might lead the parties to focus the
briefing on that one disputed issue, or it might persuade the moving
party that it was doomed to lose the motion. Either way, the process
becomes more efficient through the pre-motion conference.
The objective of such conferences is not to eliminate motion
practice altogether. Just as ajudge should not coerce a party to settle
a case against its will, neither should ajudge coerce a party not to file
or oppose a motion. So long as the process is not coercive, it can
make the litigation process more efficient.
These conferences need not increase the cost of litigation.
Although the conference is another event that the lawyers must
prepare for and attend, the legal fees for attending such a conference
should be more than offset by the savings achieved by streamlining
the process. Furthermore, if the judge concludes that the parties are
managing the litigation process well themselves without the need for
much active intervention, the conferences could simply be short
telephone conference calls to confirm that status. Ultimately, the
more involved the judge is in the pretrial process, the better able she
is to manage its course.
183. See JUD. IMPROVEMENTS COMM., PILOT PROJEcT REGARDING CASE MANAGEMENT
TEcHNIQUES FOR COMPLEX CIVIL CASEs 8 (2011), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/
show.php?db=notice_bar&id=261.
184. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (requiring parties to meet and confer to create a
discovery plan for submission to the court before seeking form discovery); FED. R.
Civ. P. 37(a) (1), (d) (1) (B) (requiring parties to meet and confer with the opposing
party before moving for an order compelling disclosure or discovery, or moving for
sanctions for failing to attend one's own deposition, answer interrogatories, or
respond to request for inspection).
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CONCLUSION
The goal of our federal judicial system is articulated in Rule 1: "the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding."' In some cases, that goal is achieved by efficient and
effective pretrial proceedings that allow the parties to prepare for and
get to trial quickly and inexpensively. In other cases, it may entail
allowing the parties to discover the information necessary to reach an
appropriate settlement. In still others, it may mean weeding out
meritless claims or defenses through appropriate motion practice.
Customizing the pretrial process to facilitate these goals requires the
exercise of discretionary judgment.
In our adversarial system, that customization is enhanced by the
involvement of a neutral third party-the judge. The data suggest
that lawyers and clients believe that active participation by the judge
makes litigation quicker, less costly, and more satisfying.'8' At the
same time, although the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allow judges to actively manage their cases, the Rules do not require
active management. While some judges may be quite active, the
majority ofjudges are just the opposite.'
We also know that inefficiencies and excessive cost in the pretrial
process are barriers to justice. Plaintiffs choose not to bring cases for
which they cannot justify the high cost of litigation.' Defendants
settle cases with little merit to avoid those same high costs.'8*
Moreover, a growing number of parties are choosing private dispute
resolution alternatives over formal litigation.'" Privatizing litigation
has many risks, including lack of appellate safeguards, loss of the
development of common law, lack of transparency, and loss of public
confidence and benefit. '
185. FED. R. Ctv. P. 1.
186. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 29, at 126 (finding that most lawyers and
litigants believe greater judicial management leads to greater party satisfaction
and efficient case resolution).
187. See, e.g., FJC REPORT, supra note 16, at 13 (noting that mostjudges entered a
case management order without first holding a Rule 16 pretrial conference).
188. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 29, at 9, 172 (reporting that almost ninety percent
of plaintiffs' lawyers turn away cases that are not cost effective).
189. See id. at 2, 157 (reporting that high litigation costs force over ninety-three
percent of defendants' lawyers to settle cases that should not be settled on the merits).
190. See Bennett et al., supra note 7, at 307 (asserting that the number of civil trials
is declining in part due to the growing popularity of alternative dispute resolution).
191. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 158, at 30 (identifying the public nature of jury
trial as central to the legitimacy of the American judicial system).
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If public litigation is to avoid extinction, it must evolve and adapt
to the new litigation environment. One important step is to increase
"sustained, active, hands-on judicial case management."'9  To achieve
this, we must embrace case management as a tool for justice instead
of fearing it as an impediment. We must select judges for their
abilities to manage cases fairly and effectively. We must orient their
education toward case management. We must mandate that they
manage their cases diligently, fairly, and transparently. And we must
evaluate them on their case management.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were conceived to be flexible
enough to handle cases of all size and substance, but they were never
designed to be static. Rather, we have a Standing Committee tasked
with the continual evaluation of the rules' efficacy'"-a recognition
that things change in the world of litigation and that the rules must
evolve in parallel. The need for active judicial case management and
the reluctance of many judges to manage their cases voluntarily
warrant an amendment to the Rules-building case management
into the federal system.
192. CIVIL LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 20, at 4.
193. See How the RulemakingProcess Works, U.S. COuRTs, http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works (la t visited
Dec. 1, 2015) (explaining that the Judicial Conference's Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, commonly known as the Standing Committee, constantly
oversees the operation of the federal rules and evaluates proposals to improve the rules
from its five Advisory Committees (on Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, Criminal, and Evidence
Rules), which, if accepted, are ultimately recommended to the U.S. Supreme Court).
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